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GEORGE ARABATZIS 
Introduction 
As in other scientific disciplines, for biological knowledge the Byzantines 
depended largely on ancient Greek science, especially of the Hellenistic pe-
riod. Under the appellation ‘biology’, we should understand those sciences 
which had to do with medicine, pharmacology, veterinary medicine, zool-
ogy, and botany.1 As regards theories about living things (animals and 
plants), Byzantium carried on a tradition that synthesized elements from an-
cient Greek philosophy and the Christian religion (especially the philosophy 
of the Church Fathers). The crucial point here is the introduction by 
Christianity of the theory of the historical creation of the world, from its 
initial elements to the formation of humans, who were seen as the crown of 
the universe. In a rural civilization like Byzantium, proximity to the world 
of plants and animals produced popular literary works that played with the 
idea of human primacy over all other living beings, primarily animals, often 
through prosopopoeia.2 Since Greco-Roman times, Aristotelian reflection on 
the conditions of knowledge of biological phenomena, in other words 
Aristotle’s biological epistemology, had fallen into oblivion;3 what re-
mained from his contribution to biology was the collection of natural data 
and curiosities that offered, together with other sources, material for late 
ancient compilations. We have to wait for the eleventh–twelfth centuries in 
order to see, in the person of Michael of Ephesus, a commentator on 
Aristotle’s philosophy of biology, and this paper will focus on him. Michael 
of Ephesus is an obscure writer; not much is known about his life, though 
there is no doubt that he is the author of a corpus of Aristotelian commen-
taries that took its final form in the eleventh–twelfth centuries.4 
                                                
1 For related bibliography, see Hunger (1978, section III/9); Vogel (1967: 264–305; 452–
70); see also Théodoridès (1977). 
2 Among these animal fables were the Physiologus, the Pulologus etc. See Krumbacher 
(1897: section 2.3). 
3 Lennox (1994: 7–24). 
4 Michael of Ephesus is now thought to be a writer of the twelfth century, one of the circle 
of the Byzantine princess Anna Komnene’s scholiasts of Aristotle, if we accept the position 
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Michael of Ephesus’ praise of the study of animals and plants 
In Parts of Animals I, there is a passage that Jaeger considered as a kind of 
encomium written by Aristotle in order to praise the empirical scientific 
method, and a work quite in opposition to the stance of Aristotle’s idealistic 
youth when he was greatly influenced by the dialectics of his master Plato. 
It is, Jaeger says, almost a confession about a new ideal of science, charac-
teristic of his philosophical evolution.5 Jaeger’s overall position about 
Aristotle’s progress in philosophy has been often criticized6 but the 
encomiastic passage is still considered emblematic of Aristotle’s progress in 
philosophy and/or his philosophical convictions.7 The passage8 was com-
                                                                                                                       
of Robert Browning (1962: 1–12). See also Frankopan (2009). For more information on 
Michael of Ephesus, see Arabatzis (2006: 17–36). 
5 See Jaeger (1934: 337). See Chroust (1963: 33), who refers to the passage as an ‘auto-
biographical sketch’.  
6 See Chroust (1963); Düring (1961: 284); Ross (1975: 8; 13); Pellegrin (1990: 65). 
7 See Shields (2007: 15): ‘This passage … provides a window into Aristotle’s emotively 
charged intellectual character’; and Pellegrin (1995: 25): it is ‘un éloge de la biologie et des 
considerations méthodiques sur l’étude des parties des animaux’. 
8 The text is as follows: ‘Of substances constituted by nature some are ungenerated, 
imperishable, and eternal, while others are subject to generation and decay. The former are 
excellent and divine, but less accessible to knowledge. The evidence that might throw light 
on them, and on the problems which we long to solve respecting them, is furnished but 
scantily by sensation; whereas respecting perishable plants and animals we have abundant 
information, living as we do in their midst, and ample data may be collected concerning all 
their various kinds, if we only are willing to take sufficient pains. Both departments, how-
ever, have their special charm. The scanty conceptions to which we can attain of celestial 
things give us, from their excellence, more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in 
which we live; just as a half glimpse of persons that we love is more delightful than an ac-
curate view of other things, whatever their number and dimensions. On the other hand, in 
certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestrial things has the advantage. More-
over, their greater nearness and affinity to us balances somewhat the loftier interest of the 
heavenly things that are the objects of the higher philosophy. Having already treated of the 
celestial world, as far as our conjectures could reach, we proceed to treat of animals, 
without omitting, to the best of our ability, any member of the kingdom, however ignoble. 
For if some have no graces to charm the sense, yet nature, which fashioned them, gives 
amazing pleasure in their study to all who can trace links of causation, and are inclined to 
philosophy. Indeed, it would be strange if mimic representations of them were attractive, 
because they disclose the mimetic skill of the painter or sculptor, and the original realities 
themselves were not more interesting, to all at any rate who have eyes to discern the causes. 
We therefore must not recoil with childish aversion from the examination of the humbler 
animals. Every realm of nature is marvellous: and as Heraclitus, when the strangers who 
came to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and hesitated to 
go in, is reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even in that kitchen di-
vinities were present, so we should venture on the study of every kind of animal without 
distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something natural and something beautiful. Ab-
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mented on by Michael of Ephesus and I will try to analyze what the 
Byzantine commentator saw in the Aristotelian exhortation to study living 
things. His commentary in extenso is as follows: 
(a) … there are things that need a brief survey, so that nothing should be left unexam-
ined. Then, this is said about ‘the exchange as to the philosophy of divine matters’; as if 
the animals and the plants were saying to us: ‘men, although the heavenly bodies are 
noble and most divine, there are still things of sublimity [θαυµάσια] about us so that 
you should take us into account [make a rational inquiry about us] and do not despise us 
in every respect’. ‘Not having graces charming the senses’, he [sc. Aristotle] said to be 
the most disgusting and aversion-provoking animals such as the snail and many others. 
And ‘not to provoke childish aversion’ means that we should not avoid like children 
those animals that are not pleasant to the eye but approach them for the sublimity [θαυ-
µάσιον] that there is in them. 
(b) The story about Heraclitus is the following: Heraclitus of Ephesus was sitting inside 
the ἰπνός (and ἰπνός means the bread oven in a house where we bake the bread and thus 
we speak about ‘ipnites bread’); sitting then in the ἰπνός and feeling hot he asked the 
strangers who came to see him to enter; ‘even here, he said, there are gods’. Because, 
the phrase ‘all is full of gods’ is a Heraclitean doctrine. And because in the works of 
nature there is above all the final cause, and everything is or becomes because of the fi-
nal cause; and as finality, he [sc. Aristotle] considered the realm of the good (because 
everything that is to become is becoming because of something that is taken as its 
good); and because it is like that, it is imperative that we investigate it. 
(c) If someone thinks of the theory of organic parts of which the animals consist as be-
ing ignoble [ἄτιµον], for not producing pleasure to our senses, he must think the same 
concerning himself; for, what pleasure can the menses of women produce, or the foetal 
membranes that cover the baby when it comes out of its mother’s womb, or the flesh, 
nerves and similar stuff of which a man consists? Significant of that is the phrase ‘one 
cannot see without much repugnance that of which a human being consists’; we name 
repugnance the sorrow that is produced to the senses or, as we might say, the disgust.9 
The passage has been divided into three sections: 
(a) In this section we form a general idea about the specificity of the ‘sci-
ences’ of living things as Michael sees it: the scholiast personifies the ani-
mals and plants so that they appear to ask for the attention of all humans—
                                                                                                                       
sence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in nature’s 
works in the highest degree, and the end for which those works are put together and pro-
duced is a form of the beautiful. If any person thinks the examination of the rest of the ani-
mal kingdom an unworthy task, he must hold in like disesteem the study of man. For no 
one can look at the elements of the human frame—blood, flesh, bones, vessels, and the 
like—without much repugnance.’ (Parts of Animals 1.5, 644b22–645a31. Trans. W. Ogle 
in Barnes [1984]. This is the English translation of Aristotle’s encomium of biology to 
which I will refer throughout the present article). 
9 In De part. an. 22.25–23.9. The translation of Michael’s texts is mine unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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not exclusively the scientists—besides the attention devoted to the noble 
things in heaven; Michael of Ephesus is not interested here either in the sci-
entist or in the cultured man as he is in the initial passage of his commentary 
(In De part. an. 1.3–2.10), making thus a shift from epistemology to the 
ontological structure of the knowing subject. Michael insists also on the 
need to transcend, in paying attention to living things, the feelings of possi-
ble disgust that stem from a childish aversion from the less appealing as-
pects of nature. 
(b) Michael refers to the well-known testimony of Aristotle about 
Heraclitus (to which Michael annexes the formula ‘all is full of gods’). 
Michael’s underscoring of the idea of the final cause is followed by a 
demand for further analysis (‘it is imperative that we investigate it’) which 
leads to the third section of the passage. 
(c) In this last section we witness the full development of Michael’s the-
sis concerning the primacy of the good of each living thing as its final cause 
and the rejection of the sentiment of aversion in the study of animals; the 
feeling of repugnance in science is supposed to become more comprehensi-
ble with the use of the examples of human anatomy and birth that cause dis-
gust. 
 
The above three parts can be summed up in the following three proposi-
tions: 
(a1)  Plants and animals ask for the attention of humans; 
(b1) ‘Philosophy’10 states that every part of the world has its own share 
of sublimity; 
(c1) Our attention should be turned towards organic material (animals 
and plants) notwithstanding the aversion that this may provoke. 
 
Two points mark a difference between Michael of Ephesus and Aristotle 
and deserve further analysis: (1) the personification of animals and plants, 
which is an innovation of Michael’s in relation to Aristotle’s text; and (2) 
the idea that no natural pleasure supports the scientific interest for living 
things. 
 
                                                
10 On what ‘philosophy’ meant precisely for Michael we are unable to pronounce in a deci-
sive and conclusive manner. Later, we shall discuss some of the evidence. 
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The ‘exchange’ between divine philosophy and 
natural science 
For Aristotle the praise of natural science is understood within the limits of 
an ‘exchange’ (ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι) with divine philosophy. This hap-
pens because, regarding living things, as he says, ‘their greater nearness and 
affinity to us balances [exchanges] somewhat the loftier interest of the 
heavenly things that are the objects of the higher philosophy …’. According 
to I. Düring, Michael’s interpretation is quite divergent from Aristotle’s po-
sition; the Stagirite, says Düring, supports a metaphysical worldview that 
relates the knowledge of living things to the knowledge of the celestial 
world.11 To reinforce his position and make the meaning of the term ‘ex-
change’ more comprehensible, Düring presents two more uses of the notion 
in Aristotle. The first has to do with communication in love relations: ‘But 
those who exchange not pleasure but utility in their love are both less truly 
friends and less constant’ (Eth. Nic. VIII 4, 1157a12, trans. W. D. Ross, re-
vised by J. O. Urmson). It is a formula that alludes, as Düring says, to the 
following passage from the Platonic Phaedo: ‘This is not the right way to 
purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, 
and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only 
right coinage, for which all those things must be exchanged and by means of 
and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom’ 
(Phaedo 69a, trans. H. N. Fowler). The second use by Aristotle of the 
‘exchange’-notion that Düring mentions is about necessity in the moral 
sphere: ‘for “necessary” does not apply to everything but only to externals; 
for instance, whenever a man receives some damage by way of alternative 
[sc. exchange] to some other greater, when compelled by circumstances’ 
(Magna Moralia I 15, 1188b19–20, trans. S. G. Stock).12 Pleasure and ne-
cessity thus form the essential meaning of ‘exchange’. 
The core of Düring’s criticism of Michael’s reading of the Aristotelian 
encomium of natural science is that the Byzantine commentator does not 
understand the mechanism of the ‘exchange’ as Aristotle had conceived of 
it. The truth is that even between modern scholars there is a difference of 
opinion about the part this mechanism plays. For J.-M. Le Blond, the ‘ex-
change’-notion suggests that Aristotle’s general views about astrobiology 
                                                
11 Düring (1943:120): ‘The sense is thus that the study of the animal nature offers in ex-
change a certain knowledge of heavenly things—a conception worthy of the master-
metaphysician Aristotle.’ 
12 See Düring (1943: 120). 
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and theology are valid even in this first book of the Parts of Animals and 
have not been developed towards empiricism as Jaeger believed to be the 
case; thus, in Aristotle we witness the ancient cosmological view that was 
based on the dichotomy between the noble celestial world and the less val-
ued terrestrial one. Consequently, if we follow the evolutionist position of 
Jaeger—as Le Blond does—this first book does not belong to the final sci-
entific phase of Aristotle’s philosophical activity.13 For Düring, on the other 
hand, the ‘exchange’-notion shows the permanent validity of a first philoso-
phy or a philosophy of first principles in Aristotle’s work independent of his 
scientific research.  
 
Does Michael’s reference to the ‘noble and most divine heavenly bodies’ 
mean that he also defends an astrobiological and theological (in the 
Aristotelian sense) worldview and, if so, is this a prelude to natural science 
or an ultimate conviction that transcends natural science? In speaking about 
nobility and divinity in the celestial sphere,  Michael says in a passage from 
his commentary on the Generation of Animals that these are determined ac-
cording to ‘immobility’;14 whereas in a passage from his In De motu an-
imalium, it is ‘priority’ that decides about the nobility and divinity.15 Is he, 
then, in his view of scientific nobility as measured by immobility and 
priority, orientated towards speculative philosophy more than towards em-
pirical research and to what extent is he giving in to Platonism in opposition 
                                                
13 J.-M. Le Blond (1945: 182–83): ‘Dans ce chapitre, comme le souligne W. Jaeger, 
Aristote semble considérer les astres et les spheres célestes d’un point de vue beaucoup 
plus positif, qui d’ailleurs se manifestait dans le traité du Ciel, à côté des considérations 
biologiques et théologiques. Dans cette perspective, le mouvement des astres est envisagé 
d’un point de vue mécaniste et matérialiste …. Jaeger semble avoir raison de supposer que 
cette perspective mécaniste et matérialiste est postérieure aux vues sur l’astrobiologie et la 
théologie sidérale. Nous croyons cependant que cette dernière perspective n’a jamais été 
écartée totalement. – En tout cas, le traité sur les Parties des Animaux ne fait allusion qu’à 
celle-ci; on peut trouver là une raison de surcroît pour refuser à ce traité une date très 
tardive.’  
14 ‘The most noble sphere is the unmoved one, then the Cronian and so forth’ (In De gen. 
an. 86.26–27). 
15 ‘Saying that the first mover always moves, he [sc. Aristotle] adds, “for the eternally no-
ble and the primarily and truly good, and not just occasionally good”, like our goods (for 
these are not always goods), “is too divine and precious to have anything prior to it”, i.e. 
that it is so divine that nothing is prior in worth to it; for such a thing is more precious 
[τιµιώτερον] than anything’ (In De motu an. 114.11–15, trans. Anthony Preus). Michael’s 
idea of a moving principle (see In De motu an. 110.14–16) is, according to Martha C. 
Nussbaum, a real contribution. See below, n. 41. 
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to Aristotelianism as Jaeger saw it, i.e. scientific empiricism? Düring does 
not believe that Michael, in interpreting the ‘exchange’-notion, thinks as a 
metaphysician, a quality that he reserves solely for Aristotle. What, then, is 
the precise nature of Michael’s interpretation? 
Another way to deal with the problem would be the following: the oppo-
sition between celestial and terrestrial is transcended in Aristotle by the es-
tablishment of different autonomous sciences that allows the scientific study 
of the material world; I have argued elsewhere that Michael defends pre-
cisely that view of science.16 Yet, his image of the natural world is different 
from Aristotle’s and the example of animals and plants appealing to the at-
tention of humans is an indication of this fact. 
In sum, the two corresponding views that can be gathered from the pas-
sages of Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus are the following: 
(1) For Aristotle, the difference in value between the celestial and the ter-
restrial world is bridged by the instauration of autonomous sciences and the 
pleasure that the scientist can draw from the study of the natural world after 
overcoming some possible aversion. 
(2) For Michael of Ephesus, living things testify to their sublimity as ob-
jects of attention; there is no appeal to natural pleasure but only a warning 
against aversion as an epistemological obstacle and a reminder of the like-
ness between the organic parts of humans and other living things. 
Thus, the surface structure of Michael’s argument may be phrased as 
follows: (a2) animals and plants ask for the attention of humans; (b2) al-
though the celestial world is noble, living things such as animals and plants 
possess their own sublimity; (c2) humans, who are part of the material 
world, should study animals and plants. 
 
(c2) needs further clarification in order to understand Michael’s position in 
relation to the modern readings of Aristotle. I will try to show next that 
Michael’s interpretation of Aristotle’s text constitutes an original approach. 
 
Beliefs, perceptions and living things 
Let us now look more carefully at the appeal of the plants and animals to 
humans and ask whether we can distinguish here some kind of scepticism 
toward general human reasoning (scepticism played a role in the Christian 
tradition as a challenge to the overestimation of human reason). The rela-
tivistic stand concerning the perception of the value of the different animal 
                                                
16 See Arabatzis (2009). 
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species is a characteristic of scepticism and constitutes one of the so-called 
sceptical modes. The idea of human excellence among the animal beings 
that is presented by the dogmatic argument goes as follows: if x appears F to 
animals of kind K, then x is F provided that K is the human kind. This posi-
tion is subject to a sceptical suspension of judgment through the following 
reasoning: x appears F to animals of kind K and x appears F* to animals of 
kind K*—but we have no reason to prefer K to K*. For the Sceptics, there is 
a primacy of perception in comparison to beliefs and thus: if x appears F to 
sense S and x appears F* to sense S*, there is no way to establish a hierar-
chy of senses or otherwise prefer S to S*.17 
The sceptical argument leads to a distinction underscored by Richard 
Sorabji between beliefs and perceptions in the animal world that has to do 
with the two general disciplines dealing with the epistemology of the sci-
ence of animals and plants: the philosophy of mind and morals. Aristotle is 
willing, says Sorabji, to grant perception to animals but not the formation of 
beliefs that for him is an exclusive faculty of the human beings. Aristotle’s 
refusal to attribute belief and reason to animals is emphatic in the De anima 
(III 3, 428a18–24).18 As we have seen in the appeal of the animals and 
plants, these appear in Michael of Ephesus to hold beliefs—the belief in 
their own, even relative, value—a position quite contrary to Aristotle’s 
views; yet, animals and plants are in need of human perception in order for 
their value to be formally recognized. A possible explanation of the reason 
for this difference between Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus would be that 
the animals’ and plants’ appeal is in the mode of ‘as if’, owing, perhaps, to 
medieval perceptions of the animals’ and plants’ position in the world as 
manifestations of godly nobility. So the whole question may be reducible to 
different cultural attitudes. It has been said that during the Middle Ages 
there was a general appeal to the testimony of creatures in order to edify the 
faithful and correct the morals; it was in fact a part of the technique of ser-
mons.19 Furthermore, a text like Physiologus, written in Alexandria in the 
third century AD, condenses the symbolic signification of every animal in 
such a way that zoological knowledge helps the understanding of the mean-
ing of the Bible. The natural characteristics of the animals thus constituted 
an allegory of the meaning of Creation.20 In Christian discourse, ‘complex 
                                                
17 See Annas and Barnes (1985: 24–25; 39; 52; 68). 
18 See Sorabji (1993: 37). 
19 Steel (1999: 11–30). 
20 Steel (1999: 12–13). 
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thoughts about soul and body, reason and emotion, salvation and damnation 
were conveyed by means of animal symbols and metaphors’.21 Yet, neither 
were animal fables unknown to Ancient Greek culture22 nor did animals 
simply play a higher role in Christian discourse, where they were often 
called to represent the ‘bestial other’.23 This last aspect was not unfamiliar 
in Byzantine culture:24 the dialectic of the humble and the noble regarding 
animals is thus present in the pagan as well as in the Christian world.  
We supposed that the plea of the animals and plants is expressed in the 
mode of ‘as if’, but the ‘as if’ mode as a literary technique does not exhaust 
all the possibilities of the valuation of living things, and in any case we do 
not have in Michael a literary use, but a philosophical one.25 The question of 
the value of animals (and plants) in Michael of Ephesus calls for further 
study of the relevant question in Aristotle. For the latter, such a use of the 
‘as if’ mode may only be imaginary, and in that he does not stand alone. In 
both modern and ancient philosophy, there are ethical systems that have 
been founded on the belief that humans are superior to animals because of 
their possession of language that reflects the possession of rationality. Sym-
bolic communication states the presence of desires and interests that are 
features proper to humans. The modern trend of ethical ‘contractualism’ 
supports the thesis that one has to be ‘like’ a human being or ‘rational agent’ 
in order to possess moral rights. In this way, ‘contractualism’ radicalizes the 
οἰκείωσις (likeness) theory that was the cornerstone of Stoic ideas about 
animals and, more precisely, of their undervaluation. The criterion of ra-
tionality is thus likeness to what a human being is.26 The rejection of ‘con-
                                                
21 Gilhus (2006: 263). 
22 For speaking animals in Ancient Greek culture and the Bible, compare Iliad 19.408–17 
and Numbers 22:28–30. 
23 Gilhus (2006: 263).  
24 In fact, animals did not possess less of an ambiguous status in Byzantine culture. We 
witness this ambiguity in various epigrams, such as the following: ‘And you also silence 
the bold passions, | when nature turning away from what is right | slips into beastly mon-
strosities’ (Arsenius); and in another version: ‘And he puts the animal passions to silence, | 
when nature deviating from what is seemly | falls into beastly monstrosities’ (Anonymus); 
the common source of the above two is: ‘And then our thoughts come to rest, which are 
like animals, | when nature deviating from what is seemly | falls into hybrid forms of best-
iality’ (George Pisides); see Lauxtermann (2003: 205). 
25 The ‘as if’ has been the subject of a particular philosophy, Hans Vaihinger’s Philosophie 
des Als Ob (1911), see Vaihinger (2007). Vaihinger’s idea is that every general term is a 
fiction, pragmatic as to its objective, and a sort of regulated error (not a hypothesis) des-
tined to produce local truths. Michael of Ephesus’ use of the ‘as if’ is also made, as we 
shall see, in the sense of an extension of categorial thought. 
26 See Sorabji (1993: 8). 
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tractualism’ and of the Stoic position does not imply the recognition of the 
value of animals, as we can see in Kant, for whom the act of harming ani-
mals is unacceptable not per se as a moral contradiction, but because it may 
imply some harm to humans.27 In Aristotle, the theory of the difference be-
tween humans and animals is stated in Historia animalium 588a20–24 and 
is summed up in the ‘man alone of animals’ formula, i.e. the denial of rea-
son to all other animals except humans (see Eth. Nic. 1098a3–4; Metaph. I, 
980b28; Pol. 1332b5–6; Eth. Eud. 1224a26–27). In Parts of Animals 
641b8–9, Aristotle says that animals have locomotion, but only humans 
possess intellect. Besides this clear-cut distinction, a theory of gradation or 
continuity from animals to human beings (scala naturae) appears in 
Aristotle’s Historia animalium 588b15ff. and in Parts of Animals 681a12–
15, which does not abolish the difference between humans and animals con-
cerning friendship (Eth. Eud. 1236b1–6), hope (De part. an. 669a20–22), 
and happiness (Eth. Nic. 1178b21–28). These views exercised a major influ-
ence upon post-Aristotelian animal philosophy when the Stoics tried to 
moralize Aristotle’s natural science. There is only one passage in Aristotle 
where his views are qualified. In the seventh chapter of the De motu animal-
ium, Aristotle came as close as possible to crediting animals with ration-
ality, a position that has created doubts as to the genuineness of the passage, 
since it seems at odds with his position elsewhere.28 On the basis of 
syllogistic thinking in humans, Aristotle noted that animals are impelled to 
movement and action by a similar desire, which comes about through sen-
sation or imagination and thought (see 701a33–36). Michael, in comment-
ing on the De motu animalium, states that ‘[i]t is the impulsive [ὁρµητική] 
and intentional [ὀρεκτική] power of the soul according to which animals 
move’.29 So it is obvious that Michael refuses reason to animals and em-
braces completely the ‘man alone of animals’ formula. Yet, although he as-
sociates himself with the dominant position of Aristotle, his approach to the 
study of living things is quite different. 
Michael turns upside down Aristotle’s order of priority as to beliefs and 
perceptions so that animals and plants appear to have beliefs, but not suit-
                                                
27 Newmyer (2006: 15–16). 
28 Newmyer (2006: 23). Pellegrin (1995: 17) notes that for Aristotle ‘l’animal, tout 
d’abord, est sujet’; yet, Aristotle refuses the (pre-Socratic) idea of a cosmic order put in 
place through narration because for him the world is constantly identical to itself and also, 
consequently, he would admit of no creationism.  This latter is the cultural setting in which 
Michael of Ephesus operates and the fiction of ‘as if’ is what he proposes.  
29 In De motu an. 116.8–9, in Preus (1981: 53). 
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able perceptions. Since Michael considers the animal beliefs in the mode of 
‘as if’, even in such a way as to attribute pure reasoning to human percep-
tion, his commentary is to be placed in a certain Peripatetic tradition that 
moves away from the Stagirite’s hierarchy of beliefs and perceptions. Thus, 
Theophrastus appears in Porphyry saying that animals use reasoning (but 
not with an argument in the ‘as if’ mode) (De abst. 3.25); and his successor, 
Strato, is of the opinion, as are some later Platonists like Damascius, that 
perception involves thinking, which (therefore) belongs to all animals (fr. 
112 Wehrli from Plutarch, De soll. an. 961A). From the second century AD 
comes another ‘unorthodox’ statement by the Aristotelian Aristocles of 
Messene who argued that human perception involves belief (δόξα) (fr. 
4.23–24 Chiesara).30 Aristotle would have strongly opposed this position, 
i.e. the idea that perceiving involves cognizing (γνωρίζειν). 
Yet, Michael’s extension of the capacity for belief to plants makes his 
possible inclusion among the exponents of these later Peripatetic ideas prob-
lematic. By making plants as well as animals express opinions, does he 
mean to say that plants also hold beliefs? I think that a different meaning 
must be given to the idea that animals and plants express an apology of the 
importance of living things. Referring to an analysis that I have made of 
Michael’s commentary on Parts of Animals I, 1.3–2.1031 as to the nature of 
his epistemology, I would say that the voice of the animals is none other 
than the appeal of intentionality; in other words, the animals and plants that 
are thought to hold beliefs represent nothing other than intentional objects 
and so the ‘as if’ mode refers to the idea of intentionality. In this case, the 
‘existence commitment’ of the proposition is in no way necessary for the 
intentional act. The situation is different with regard to the ‘truth commit-
ment’ of the intentional proposition. More precisely, the intentional charac-
ter of the phrase ‘animals and plants say: animals and plants are worthy of 
scientific interest’, although not ‘existentially committed’—i.e. not real 
(animals and plants do not speak)—does not alter the ‘truth commitment’ of 
the basic proposition ‘animals and plants are worthy of scientific interest’. 
By using the ‘as if’ mode, Michael advances a double idea of common in-
tentionality and propositional truth that I shall discuss later.32 
                                                
30 See Sorabji (1993: 45–47). The editor of Aristocles, M. L. Chiesara, resists Sorabji’s 
idea (ibid. 46) that Aristocles’ argument is ‘unorthodox’ regarding Aristotelianism (see 
Chiesara 2001: 133–34). 
31 See Arabatzis (2006: 318–22) and (2009: 179–84). 
32 In modern thought, there is a double approach as to the relations of intentionality with 
propositional truth. First, there is the heritage of the Austrian school, the ‘rigorous’ pheno-
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The Heraclitus example and the ‘incarnation predicament’ 
The reference to Heraclitus constitutes the second step in Michael’s argu-
ment. Yet, right from the start, we have to face a difficulty: Michael annexes 
to the Aristotelian testimony about Heraclitus a second phrase of supposedly 
Heraclitean origin, the proposition ‘all is full of gods’. In reality, this phrase 
belongs to Thales as Aristotle himself states in a critical manner in his De 
anima.33 Plato mentions the same phrase without attributing it to Thales,34 
so that one may suppose that Michael is drawing here on Plato rather than 
Aristotle. On the other hand, Michael is familiar with the De anima,35 so the 
attribution of Thales’ saying to Heraclitus may be thought to be an error due 
either to the absence of the original text and its quotation from memory or to 
the use of a faulty compilation. To be more exact, Michael does not say that 
                                                                                                                       
menology and analytic philosophy (J. P. Searle) and, second, a less rigorous phenomeno-
logical tendency that makes a loose use of the notion of ‘intentionality’. See Mulligan 
(2003). 
33 The Aristotelian passage referring to ‘all is full of gods’ is as follows: ‘Certain thinkers 
say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe, and it is perhaps for that reason that 
Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of gods. This presents some difficulties: 
why does the soul when it resides in air or fire not form an animal, while it does so when it 
resides in mixtures of the elements, and that although it is held to be of higher quality when 
contained in the former? (One might add the question, why the soul in air is maintained to 
be higher and more immortal than that in animals.) Both possible ways of replying to the 
former question lead to absurdity or paradox; for it is beyond paradox to say that fire or air 
is an animal, and it is absurd to refuse the name of animal to what has soul in it. The opin-
ion that the elements have soul in them seems to have arisen from the doctrine that a whole 
must be homogeneous with its parts. If it is true that animals become animate by drawing 
into themselves a portion of what surrounds them, the partisans of this view are bound to 
say that the soul too is homogeneous with its parts. If the air sucked in is homogeneous, but 
soul heterogeneous, clearly while some part of soul exist in the inbreathed air, some other 
part will not. The soul must either be homogeneous, or such that there are some parts of the 
whole in which it is not to be found. From what has been said it is now clear that knowing 
as an attribute of soul cannot be explained by soul’s being composed of the elements, and 
that it is neither sound nor true to speak of soul as moved’ (De anima I 411a7–26, trans. J. 
A. Smith). 
34 Plato’s text is as follows: ‘Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the 
years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same,—
namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by one or more souls, 
which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods, whether it 
be that they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever 
the mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it 
denied that “all things are full of gods”?’ (Laws X 899b, trans. R. G. Bury). See also Epi-
nomis 991d. 
35 Michael is said to have commented on the De anima (see Arabatzis 2006: 1) and refers 
to it in his In De part. an. 
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the phrase is by Heraclitus but that it is a Heraclitean doctrine (δόγµα). 
Michael, possibly, draws here from Diogenes Laertius who says that ‘It 
seemed [ἐδόκει] to him [sc. Heraclitus] … that all things are full of souls 
and demons’ (7.7–11 Marcovich = DK 22A 1.34–35).36 This forces us to 
look closer at the reasons that may have made him compare the proposition 
that ‘even here, there are gods’ to ‘all is full of gods’. It is obvious from 
what is said before that Michael values the science of living things, for 
which the Heraclitean affirmation is evidence, in relation to soul, divinity 
and nature. Aristotle himself produces another version of the phrase ‘all is 
full of gods’ by writing ‘all is full of soul’.37 In general, as to the distinction 
between a Platonic and an Aristotelian approach to the phrase, Michael 
stands closer to the positive position of Plato than to the critical one by 
Aristotle. Should we speak here of panpsychism or pantheism, as is usually 
maintained? G. S. Kirk in commenting on the phrase proposes the term 
‘hylozoism’ on the condition that this applies to three different ideas: (a) the 
inference (conscious or not) that all things are in some way living things; (b) 
the conviction that the cosmos is permeated with life and that those of its 
parts which seem lifeless are in fact living; and (c) the tendency to face the 
world as a totality, whatever its constitution may be, i.e. as one living or-
ganism.38 The philosophical qualification of Michael’s approach is the prob-
lem stemming from the fact that the phrase ‘all is full of gods’ is linked to 
the Heraclitean ‘even here there are gods’.39 
                                                
36 See Arabatzis (2010: 387). 
37 De gen. an. III 762a21. 
38 G. S. Kirk in Kirk, Raven & Schofield (1983: 109). 
39 As to the meaning of the Heraclitus story, it has been proposed that it is an ironic expres-
sion used by Heraclitus against Hesiod or Pythagoras (see Robertson 1938: 10). Another 
scholar, L. Robert, refutes the irony hypothesis in order to point at what is most evident: the 
presence of the Heraclitean fire in the furnace that explains the presence of the divine (Rob-
ert 1965–66: 61–73). A very particular interpretation is that of Martin Heidegger (1978: 
234) who relates the passage with the phrase ‘ethos is the demon to human’ (ἦθος ἀνθρώ-
πωι δαίµων: DK 22B 119). According to him, the term ‘ethos’ does not refer to a moral 
stand but to the residence of humans that is, as long as they are humans, the proximity to 
god. More precisely, the affirmation that ‘even here, there are gods’ signifies a critique of 
everyday life. Heraclitus’ visitors expect to see a ‘philosopher philosophizing’, but what 
they come up with is the disappointing image of a poor man who lives beside an oven 
because he feels cold. Heraclitus senses their disappointment and in order to prevent them 
from going away (because visitors like them if displeased leave immediately) says to them 
that ‘even here, there are gods’; the ‘here’ means the oven, but also the ‘home’ of the philo-
sopher. This phrase, says Heidegger, considers the residence of the philosopher (‘ethos’) 
from a new angle: even in the shadow of the habitual we sense the gods. See also Gregoric 
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The intentionality theory mentioned before helps the comprehension of 
Michael’s approach: in the Heraclitus example we see an opposition formed 
by the idea of a social or common intentionality based on perception that is 
overcome by a propositional intentionality: the common intentionality is 
that of the visitors, the propositional one is that of the saying. The laymen’s 
perception of Heraclitus sitting beside the bread oven is characterized by an 
evaluation on the basis of pleasure and pain (the outcome of the visit being 
the possible satisfaction or displeasure of the visitors). Michael feels the 
need to insist upon the fact that we are talking about an oven (ἰπνός) and 
thus reinforces the sense of opposition between the divine nobility contained 
and the humble container. The problem is to understand exactly what, for 
Michael, are the poles of the opposition in the Heraclitean paradigm. In a 
passage from his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, the intellect and 
the science that are opposed to the animal condition (appetites and sensa-
tions) appear in Michael as stages in the ascent toward the divine and the 
transcendental in Neoplatonic, but also Christian terminology (cf. the ex-
pression ‘immaculate light’ = τὸ φῶς τὸ ἄχραντον):40 
… escaping from the appetites of  every kind and the consecutive sensations that de-
ceive the intellect and introducing fantasies as introducing forming and dividing princi-
ples and something like an unsolvable multiplicity, rejecting the opinions as multiple 
and in themselves and for the other things, and mixed to the senses and the imagination 
(because every opinion acts together with irrational sensation and imagination), return-
ing to science and intellect, and after that to the life of intellect and the simple intuition, 
and in the process receiving the illumination from the divine and filling inside with the 
immaculate light. What is the good by which the divine rewards those who engage 
themselves in the intellect that is relative to it?41 
Assuming that Michael is a Christian Platonist (in the sense of adhering to 
the views expressed in the above terminology), the phrases ‘even here, there 
are gods’ and ‘all is full of gods’ may be taken as an illustration of an 
‘Incarnation Predicament’ (henceforth IP). By this last term I refer to the 
apology of the material or empirical world surrounding us made by the 
Christians, who see it as the product of the Creation, thus fighting against 
Manichaean dualism, which understands the world as the outcome of the 
fall and the reign of evil. The passage we are studying here thus possibly 
                                                                                                                       
(2001), which takes into (critical) account earlier interpretations, including Robertson’s, 
Robert’s and Heidegger’s, and offers a cultural reading of the Heraclitus anecdote. 
40 See Symeon the New Theologian, Hymn 25, 149. 
41 In Eth. Nic. Χ, 603.16–30. Michael draws here on Proclus; the citations from the Proclan 
text were noted by Carlos Steel and are indicated in the text with italics. See Steel (2002: 
55–56).  
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marks Michael’s disposition to relate the world even in its least appealing 
aspects with the divine. Consequently, the phrase ‘all is full of gods’ cannot 
refer either to panpsychism or to pantheism because something like that 
would invalidate the IP and especially its implications of the existence of a 
separate, non-corporeal Divine principle that ennobles the whole, whether 
material or not.42 From this point of view, Michael cannot subscribe to a 
speculative worldview where first philosophy plays the part of theology; this 
role is solely reserved for Christian theology and thus Michael seems to 
inherit Neoplatonic intellectualism, but not Neoplatonic metaphysics. This 
disposition allows him to value the exterior world, notwithstanding its dis-
comforting sides, as part of Creation—in accordance with the IP—and to 
conceive simultaneously of what I will describe later as scientific intention-
ality towards the world. The idea that the Heraclitus example concerns the 
distinction between divine nobility and the humble material world is rein-
forced by the fact that the ‘foetal membranes that cover the baby when it 
comes out of its mother’s womb’ and the other organic parts to which 
Michael refers are used by the Neoplatonists and notably Porphyry as a cri-
tique of the Christian belief that God was born from a woman’s womb.43 
 
Let us summarize the insight offered by the implications of the IP. The two 
poles of the dichotomy that the IP seems to transcend are the following: the 
                                                
42 There is a rejection of divine corporeality in Michael due most probably to his Christian 
culture. Nussbaum thinks that Michael’s expression ‘if there were, among beings and hav-
ing reality, some powers greater than the powers of heaven and earth, they would move 
tomorrow or some time’ from his commentary on De motu animalium (110.14–16: trans. 
Preus) is a real contribution to the comprehension of Aristotle’s expression ‘if there are 
superior motions, these will be dissolved by one another’ from De motu animalium 
699b25–26 (trans. A. S. L. Farquharson), and she thinks that the Byzantine scholiast’s hy-
pothesis about a moving principle that, if it could exercise a force greater than the forces of 
earth and heaven, would do so and destroy the world, is correct. Nevertheless, Nussbaum 
believes that Michael’s interpretation of Aristotle’s moving principle as an interaction of 
forces and bodies is erroneous. For Aristotle, Nussbaum says, the moving principle with a 
force capable of moving and eventually destroying the world must be also a body—a sixth 
body different from the five physical ones. (The reason is that Aristotle continues by saying 
that the force of the aforesaid body cannot be infinite because there cannot be an infinite 
body: ‘for they cannot be infinite because not even body can be infinite’; see 699b27–28). 
Thus, Michael’s interpretation, Nussbaum says, is half right—as long as it points to one 
moving principle for Aristotle’s passage—and half erroneous—for not attributing to this 
moving principle the quality of being a body (see Nussbaum 1978: 317–18; for a different 
view, see Preus 1981, 75). For a Christian or someone brought up in a Christian culture as 
Michael was, this interpretation stands midway between Aristotle and Christianity.  
43 See von Harnack (1916: fr. 77). 
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noble intellect and the humble material world. The problem would be to 
state how this transcendence works. It seems that we have here a form of 
syllogism where the IP is elevated to the status of the major term that cor-
relates logically the animals’ and plants’ appeal to humans with the sur-
passing of human aversion toward the organic parts of bodies and the study 
of living things as a noble scientific activity. 
Thus, the argument of Michael in this perspective may be formulated in 
the following way: (a3) The IP states that the world as God’s creation is in-
variably noble; (b3) animals and plants are parts of the world; (c3) humans 
must study animals and plants as parts of God’s invariably noble creation. 
On this view, the basic argument of the call to the study of living things 
would be part of a more extensive position that schematically states: ‘Look 
at the wonders that God created in the natural world.’ 
Nevertheless, this view is a problematic one and cannot be defended con-
clusively. First of all, the Christian perception of the material world is not 
governed in its totality by the good will inherent in the IP. This good will 
was made act through incarnation only once as proof of the Lord’s immense 
love for humankind and it does not abolish the divinity’s otherness from the 
material world. Another problem is that of the meaning of the aversion 
experienced in seeing certain organic parts of the natural world. Michael 
does not seem to deny the well-foundedness of this feeling that he uses as an 
argument in order to dissociate natural science from natural pleasure. This 
attitude may also mark a Christian’s ambivalence regarding the valuation of 
the natural world.44 
 
Pleasure, happiness and the living things 
Up to this point, we have distinguished two major tendencies in Michael’s 
views concerning the study of animals and plants: (c1) there is an appeal to 
turn our attention towards organic material (animals and plants),45 notwith-
                                                
44 See Goldman (1975). Goldman is criticizing Kojève’s position that modern science has 
its origins in the doctrine of the Incarnation of God as an apology of the material world (see 
Kojève 1964). 
45 The nature of the plants may also be aversion-provoking in Aristotle: see Eth. Nic. X 6, 
1176a34–45; also, there are forms of life that are indeterminately animals or plants, like the 
sessile sponges, the anthozoans and ascidians that are distinguished for their resemblance to 
plants (De part. an. 681a10–b9); the repugnance of the parts of the plants may not refer to 
vision, but to other senses like taste or smell; see On Sense and the Sensibles 5; see also 
Theophrastus, History of Plants 10. 
Michael of Ephesus and the philosophy of living things    67 
 
standing the aversion that this may provoke; and (c2) humans, who are part 
of the material world, should study animals and plants. 
According to Aristotle, the aversion that may be produced during the sci-
entific work is overcome by the natural pleasure of knowledge; this is not 
the view of Michael, for whom the aversion provoked by some organic parts 
cannot be outweighed by any scientific pleasure. To explain Michael’s the-
sis, a third proposition, based on the IP, was advanced, stating: (c3) humans 
must study animals and plants as part of God’s invariably noble creation. 
(c3) could satisfactorily fill the gap between (c1) and (c2) but was seen 
above to be a problematic view. In fact, the world is not invariably noble in 
the text of Michael of Ephesus. The celestial world is said to be noble 
(τίµια), but the world of living things other than humans is said to possess 
sublimity (τὸ θαυµάσιον). In the search for an understanding of the dif-
ference, we may look to Aristotle, who makes various uses of the term θαυ-
µάσιος, first in relation to animals: ‘The phenomena of the generation in 
regard to the mouse are the most astonishing (θαυµασιωτάτη)’ (Hist. an. 
580b10, trans. D’A. W. Thompson), and also in relation to a certain kind of 
wisdom: ‘Whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, 
for myth is composed of wonders (θαυµάσια)’ (Metaph. I, 982b18–19, 
trans. W. D. Ross). In the De anima, the θαυµάσιον is said to be constitu-
tive of the value of knowledge and scientific research: ‘Holding as we do 
that, while knowledge of any kind is a thing to be honoured and prized, one 
kind of it may, either by reason of its greater exactness or of a higher dignity 
and greater wonderfulness (θαυµασιωτέρων) in its objects, be more hon-
ourable and precious than another, on both accounts we should naturally be 
led to place in the front rank the study of the soul’ (402a1–4, trans. J. A. 
Smith). And again, in the De generatione animalium 731a33–b2, we see the 
term related to the subject of human and animal knowledge: ‘[The animals] 
have sense perception, and this is a kind of knowledge; if we consider the 
value (τὸ τίµιον καὶ ἄτιµον) of this we find that it is of great importance 
compared with the class of lifeless objects, but of little compared with the 
use of intellect. For against the latter the mere participation in touch and 
taste seems to be practically nothing, but beside plants and stones it seems 
most excellent (θαυµάσιον)’ (trans. A. Platt). 
 
In Michael of Ephesus, there are two uses of the term, first in his commen-
tary on Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, where a human virtue appears 
to surpass in sublimity a star like Venus: ‘Justice appears to be excellent and 
more wonderful (θαυµασιωτέρα) than the star of Venus itself’ (In Eth. Nic. 
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V, 8.3–4). In his commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi (2.20–22), Michael 
refers to the Platonic Euthydemus where ‘Socrates says, speaking to Crito, 
that sophistry is wonderful (θαυµασία)’. In fact, we find three occurrences 
of the term in Euthydemus, when Plato speaks of ‘wonderful speeches’ 
(283a7), ‘wonderful wisdom’ (288b6), and finally the ‘wonderful Sophists’ 
(305b4), as Michael says. I translated θαυµάσιον here as ‘sublimity’ (and 
not as ‘wonderful’, ‘excellent’, or even ‘astonishing’ as others translators 
do) because I wish to suggest the double use made by Michael of the term 
as a real or phenomenal excellence as well as an ironic one; the word ‘sub-
limity’ can convey better the double, real and phenomenal feature.46 The 
problem is how to relate the noble-humble division of a world that is every-
where equally worthy of knowledge to the distinction between pleasure and 
pain (aversion). For this, I will quote a crucial passage from Michael con-
cerning the difference between humans and animals with regard to happi-
ness: 
He [sc. Aristotle] says, once the omissions and that which must be supplied from else-
where are brought together, that in accordance with the assumptions of the Epicurean 
and later Stoic philosophers concerning happiness, one can attribute a share of happi-
ness even to the non-rational animals, while according to myself and Plato and others 
who along with us would place happiness in the intellective life, it is impossible for the 
non-rational animals to be happy in that way ….47 
So it appears that happiness cannot be granted to animals and, by the same 
token, to plants. Here Michael is setting himself against Aristotle, the 
Epicureans (a logical opposition for a Byzantine Christian) and the later 
Stoa. What marks a difference in this case is the theory of happiness in the 
later Stoa that postulates common trends in Aristotle, the Epicureans and 
Stoicism. In constrast to the later Stoa, Michael opposes the theory that 
there is a general pleasure according to nature and, similarly, he distances 
himself from Aristotelian ethics where natural pleasure plays a constitutive 
                                                
46 In Christian literature also, the term has a dominant positive meaning (see for example 
Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. VIII in Cant., in Migne, PG 44: col. 948C), unless it refers to her-
esy (Hippolytus, Haer., in Migne, PG 16: col. 3139B). 
47 In Eth. Nic. Χ, 598.19–24 (quoted in Praechter [1990: 40]): λέγει δὲ ὡς συλλεξαµένους 
τὰ παραλελειµµένα καὶ ὧν προσυπακούειν ἔξωθεν χρή, ὅτι κατὰ µὲν τὰς τῶν ἄλλων 
φιλοσόφων Ἐπικουρείων τε καὶ τῶν ὕστερον Στωικῶν περὶ εὐδαιµονίας ὑπολήψεις 
δύναταί τις εὐδαιµονίαν µεταδιδόναι καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις, κατ' ἐµὲ δὲ καὶ Πλάτωνα 
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσοι τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν ἐν νοερᾷ ζωῇ ἱστῶµεν, ἀδύνατον κατὰ ταύτην 
εὐδαιµονεῖν τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων …. 
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role.48 Instead, the early Stoics, to whom Michael seems to align himself, or 
at least whose contribution he seems to acknowledge, declared that living 
according to nature is living according to reason and that pleasure is only 
accessory to living things.49 Compare this view with Aristotle’s following 
passage from the encomium of natural science in the Parts of Animals: ‘for 
if some have no graces to charm the sense, yet nature, which fashioned 
them, gives amazing pleasure in their study to all who can trace links of 
causation, and are inclined to philosophy’ (645a8–11). It is a thesis to which 
Michael does not subscribe, since for him simple nature may never be a 
source of pleasure, but only the pure intellect can be such and, in any case, 
if bodily pleasures are embraced as goods, they will obscure the real 
(intellectual) pleasures.50 The difficulty that consists in the fact that pleasure 
cannot be a criterion of happiness was already brought up by Cicero who 
reproduced some relevant Stoic ideas: 
But when you try to prove the Wise Man happy on the ground that he enjoys the great-
est mental pleasures, and that these are infinitely greater than bodily pleasures, you do 
not see the difficulty that meets you. For it follows that mental pains which he experi-
ences will also be infinitely greater than the bodily ones. Hence he whom you maintain 
to be always happy would inevitably be sometimes miserable; nor in fact will you ever 
prove him to be invariably happy, as long as you make pleasure and pain the sole stan-
dard (trans. H. Rackham).51 
The relation between natural and bodily pleasures is for Michael quite dif-
ferent from what this is for Aristotle and I will try to show next in which 
way the difference is established. Michael states that: 
Every mind is searching for its proper good and has the intuition of it or dreams about it 
and submits to the animal and oppressive pleasures, which are not properly pleasures 
because of their evil lessons and the necessary and consequent ignorance of the real 
pleasures. Because the judging mind is overtaken by darkness about the real pleasures, 
which are not like that … (In Eth. Nic. X, 538.12–16). 
                                                
48 Cf. Panaetius’ notion of happiness ‘in accordance to nature’ (apud Stobaeum, 2.7 = 
Panaetius fr. 109 van Straaten). See Sorabji (1993: 139). As to whether pleasure exists 
according to nature there was already a controversy in antiquity; see Sextus Empiricus, 
Adv. Math. XI, 73. See Haynes (1962: 414). 
49 Zeno in Diogenes Laertius VII 85. 
50 For Michael’s theory of happiness, see Ierodiakonou (2009: 185–201); Donato (2006: 
180–84). 
51 Cicero, De finibus II 33.108: ‘sed dum efficere vultis beatum sapientem cum maximas 
animo voluptates percipiat omnibusque partibus maiores quam corpore, quid occurrat non 
videtis. Animi enim dolores quoque percipiet omnibus partibus maiores quam corporis. Ita 
miser sit aliquando necesse est is quem vos beatum semper vultis esse; nec vero id dum 
omnia ad voluptatem doloremque referetis efficietis umquam.’ 
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A distinction between animal pleasures and real pleasures contributes to the 
understanding of the exhortation to study living things. The absence of bod-
ily pleasure in the perception of the parts of animals may be a sign of true 
intellectual activity. But this cannot really cover the totality of Michael’s 
argument. The distinction between real pleasure and bodily pleasure will not 
explain much unless the broader theoretical frame of which it is extracted is 
further clarified. 
Pleasure is not, in any case, really Michael’s argument. What he says is 
that absence of pleasure or aversion is an obstacle to the appreciation of the 
value of natural science since it may cause suspicion as to its nobility and 
make it appear as ἄτιµον. It is not that Michael considers all the living 
things abhorrent, since the childish aversion concerns the most disgusting of 
them. To these latter are assimilated the parts of the human body in order to 
prove the human affiliation to the natural world. But what directs humans to 
natural science is the finality of reaching the realm of the good that should 
bring with it intellectual pleasure. But if this is a finality, it is not inherent in 
scientific activity, as it might have been for Aristotle who grounds this ac-
tivity on an ontological desire for knowledge. In late antiquity, the philoso-
phical theorization of pleasure owes much to Plato’s Philebus where the 
ideas of pleasure as a mixed good as well as a return to the natural condition 
(but not the natural condition in itself) were of prime importance. Michael 
of Ephesus seems to combine the Plotinian and Proclan dualism that re-
serves all passions for the body with the later Neoplatonists’ claim that pas-
sions can reach the soul and change it in substance (something that was un-
acceptable for Plotinus). Furthermore, Michael seems here to especially 
object to Damascius’ theory of pleasure exposed in his commentary on 
Philebus.52 Damascius is in fact presenting a theory of pleasure that com-
bines Aristotelian, Epicurean and late Stoic elements.53 On the basis of the 
attribution of cognition to perception that extends to all living things, he 
tries to make pleasure not only a characteristic of the movement towards the 
natural condition, but a characteristic of the natural condition itself. To this, 
Michael, who is particularly reluctant to accept the analogy between the two 
term pairs pleasure-cognition and perception-cognition, is strongly opposed. 
For Michael, the movement to the natural condition is indistinctively the 
cause of pleasure or pain, while the intellectual condition that is seen as the 
                                                
52 Westerink (1959). It must be noted that in the manuscript tradition, the commentaries on 
the Phaedo and those on the Philebus are placed together. Michael refers to the Philebus in 
his commentaries (see In Eth. Nic. X, 536.15; 542.22; 542.29; 542.32). 
53 Riel (2000: 134–76). 
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cause of real pleasures must first achieve a state of neutrality towards the 
natural condition. 
 
In Christian thought we see the idea of pleasure associated with a false sci-
ence, as in the case of the art of divinization. Thus, in Gregory of Nyssa’s 
Contra fatum, pleasure is in fact a major constituent of the divinatory arts 
because that is what makes such a false science plausible to humans who 
desire to know the future. Organic parts play a role in the practice of those 
arts, as for instance in the inspection of livers in order to predict the future 
and thus, says Gregory, pleasure gives to the evil deed the form of good, 
just as the taste of honey can cover what is distasteful.54 It is not openly 
stated that true science may have to do with a direct overcoming of aver-
sion, but since false science has to hide the unpleasant aspects of its prac-
tices and objectives under a pleasurable appearance (or in the prospect of 
bodily pleasure), such a direct overcoming may be implied by Gregory of 
Nyssa. The apology of the material world through the IP and the advance-
ment of a disinterested regard (without the dominant search for pleasure) 
toward the surrounding world allow the formation of some sort of objectiv-
ity. Such a perception of the epistemological past would mean, regarding 
the Middle Ages in general and the Byzantine Middle Ages in particular, 
something more than the search for ‘psychological anachronisms’;55 it 
would in fact be something like a research programme for the origins of sci-
entific psychology.  
 
                                                
54 See Contra fatum 59 McDonough: ‘We can recognize the divine nature and its attributes 
by all those things which are opposite to it, for example, death instead of life, deceit instead 
of truth and every type of evil inimical to man. Anyone who embraces these becomes an 
abomination. Persons who often commit evil deeds offer a deadly cure since it is disguised 
with honey which cannot be tasted. Similarly, that corruptible nature within the soul se-
duces a person by assuming a good form and veils deception under the guise of a cure. 
People rush after this deadly poison thinking it to be good while it contains nothing bene-
ficial. Thus whenever we encounter anyone with the pretense of knowing the future through 
deception which is controlled by demons, for example, through divinization, augury, 
omens, oracles about the dead and genealogies, each one is different and predicts the future 
in dissimilar ways. Therefore inspecting a liver or observing birds in flight to foresee the 
future do not promise their outcome by fate’s compulsion. We claim that all these examples 
have one cause and assume one form (I mean demonic deception) since a prediction does 
not come true at a given time if indeed it does occur.’  
55 See Beaujouan (1997: 23–30). 
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Intentionality and propositional content in 
Michael of Ephesus’ philosophy of living things 
To summarize Michael’s position we should say that for him aversion or 
absence of pleasure may hinder scientific activity and consequently con-
demn it as ἄτιµον. Thus, pleasure and pain are situated on a more basic 
level of the human being (since the feeling of disgust appears to be some-
how identical to childish aversion). We should compare here the impossi-
bility that bodily pleasure constitutes a criterion with the declared need, ac-
cording to Michael of Ephesus, for a prospective natural scientist to face the 
organic parts of living bodies. Also, we must not forget that the appeal for 
the study of living things is addressed to every human and not only to the 
scientists. This reinforces the idea that the problem is treated here on the 
ontological, rather than the epistemological level. The question of material 
bodies, the perception of them with pain and pleasure, can be attached to the 
following passage from the commentary on Books IX–X of the 
Nicomachean Ethics;56 here Michael makes use of the significant term 
σωµατοειδής, that is, bodily, material, corporeal: 
the visual perception of the forms is a perception of them without the matter, as 
Aristotle has shown in the second book of De anima …, without the underlying matter. 
The hearing and the smell are more corporeal (σωµατοειδεῖς) and they perceive the 
sensed objects more passively together with their matter (569.8–14). 
De anima II is an important work with regard to intentionality and its rela-
tion to physicalism since it proclaims that every sense-perception is of a 
sensible form (424a17–21). Thus, pure form guarantees intentionality but, at 
the same time, intentionality requires a physiological change. The sense or-
gans transform the real objects into intentional objects and yet the inten-
tional objects are in the sphere of the intellect.57 Although the animals in 
Michael may be considered as bodies without reason, in no case can they be 
thought as σωµατοειδῆ; this last term refers explicitly to a hierarchy of 
human senses and to human perception, which have meaning only for ra-
tional beings like humans. 
There is only one occurrence of σωµατοειδής in the Aristotelian corpus, 
in Problems 24, 936b35, where we read: ‘but substances which have body 
                                                
56 For the close relation between Michael’s scholia to the De partibus animalium and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, see Arabatzis (2009: 170–71), where it is shown that both commen-
taries belong to the later phase of Michael’s scholiastic activity. 
57 Perler (2003: 20–21). 
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in them, like thick soups and silver, since, owing to their weight, they 
contain much corporeal matter (σωµατοειδές) and offer resistance, because 
they are subjected to violent force as the heat tries to make its way out, form 
bubbles wherever the heat prevails’ (trans. E. S. Forster). Σωµατοειδής, as 
Michael uses it, stands rather closer to Plato’s Phaedo: ‘Because each 
pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes 
it corporeal (σωµατοειδῆ), so that it fancies the things are true which the 
body says are true’ (83d, trans. H. N. Fowler); in Phaedo again, at another 
point, Plato says: ‘so that it thought nothing was true except the corporeal 
(σωµατοειδές), which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ 
in the pleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid 
that which is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is intelligible and 
tangible to philosophy’ (81b, trans. H. N. Fowler). Michael Psellos also uses 
the term in relation to demons and to humans after the fall (see Philosophica 
Minora II 37.11–13 and Theologica I 30, 127–30). It is more likely that 
Michael did not borrow the term σωµατοειδής from Plato, Psellos or from 
his regular source Proclus, who uses it quite frequently, as in Inst. theol. 
197.5–7. The closest parallel to Michael’s notion of the term is to be found 
in Damascius: 
The ‘body-like’ [σωµατοειδές] is different from the body: it is an affect of the soul, 
brought about in it by the body. Body-like is also the ‘phantom’ formed by such a kind 
of life-force and a more rarefied bodily substance, of which Plato says that it is 
‘weighed down’ and that it is ‘seen in the neighbourhood of graves’; hence it is said to 
‘accompany’ the soul. It is ‘produced by those souls’ that are still tied to the visible; this 
is why they can be seen, through participation in the visible or through affinity with it.58 
The logical opposition of σωµατοειδής to the nobility of scientific activity 
reminds us of the discussion in Plato’s Parmenides about the existence or 
not of the ideas of the humblest, ignoble things (ἀτιµότατον) (130c ff.). To 
the problem that arises there, Michael would answer in the most unequivo-
cal way: the τιµιώτερον (nobility) of the study of living things is based on 
the degree of the τιµιώτερον of human intentional acts (meaning the acts of 
a higher intentionality).59 
                                                
58 Damascius, In Philebum §352 Westerink. 
59 The purity of the intellect goes together with the purity of the eye and the whole consti-
tutes a metaphor for the superiority of contemplative happiness: ‘sight is superior to touch 
in purity, and hearing and smell to taste; the pleasures, therefore, are similarily superior, 
and those of thought superior to these, and within each of the two kinds some are superior 
to others’ (Eth. Nic. 1176a1–3, trans. W. D. Ross revised by J. O. Urmson). To this passage 
responds Michael’s In Eth. Nic. X, 569.8–14, quoted earlier, as well as the metaphor of the 
‘eye’ of prudence from In Eth. Nic. X, 609.6–10. For the latter, see Arabatzis (2009: 165). 
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While still on the subject of the term σωµατοειδής and its uses, we 
should add to our consideration of the obvious Platonic heritage60 further 
investigation of the Neoplatonic one. It is probable that the distinguishing 
character of the σωµατοειδής in Michael comes from its opposition to the 
notion of λογοειδής. Simplicius (or Priscian) quotes Iamblichus ap-
provingly for saying that humans have perception in a different sense from 
animals: human perception has a rational form (λογοειδής), whereas animal 
perception is body-centered. Animal perception can recognize (γνῶσις) that 
the seen thing is a man, but it cannot say whether this recognition (γνῶσις 
or κρίσις) is true or false. Such an appreciation would be self-reflection 
(ἐπιστροφή), which is impossible for the senses of living things such as 
animals and plants, which cannot get away from the body.61 Thus, 
σωµατοειδής and λογοειδής refer to states of mind or, for Michael, 
intentional states of mind.  
There is in the epistemology of Michael of Ephesus, in his commentary 
on Parts of Animals I (1.3–2.10), a theory or proto-theory of intentionality.62 
Michael’s intentionality theory is suggested there by the terms σκοπεῖν and 
θεωρεῖν; the first would be a pre-reflexive intentionality, the one that 
probably causes pleasure and pain; the second is the one that produces the 
                                                
60 The allegiance to Plato is significant in relation to what can be considered as the 
‘Christian Platonism’ of Michael of Ephesus. We can witness it in his commentary on 
Democritus’ positions as transmitted by Aristotle in Parts of Animals, where, according to 
A. P. D. Mourelatos, there is a ‘non-reductivist gloss’ on Democritus B 165. According to 
Aristotle, Democritus approached natural science as though it were about the material cause 
and he neglected the final cause or the formal cause; and Michael specifies: ‘It is evident to 
everyone what sort of thing man and each of the animals is in terms of shape and color; it is 
what they are in terms of matter that is non-evident. But if this is so, then our inquiry into it 
ought to be concerned with the non-evident, not with what is most evident’ (In De part. an. 
5.36-6.3, trans. Mourelatos 2003: 51). Mourelatos notes that, ‘in all likelihood, Michael 
knows nothing more about Democritus’ anthropology than what he gleans from the 
Aristotle’s passage he is paraphrasing. Still, could Michael’s gloss serve to inspire a viable 
reading of B 165? The message of the saying ‘Man is what we all know’ might have been 
this: ignore or set aside what is manifest; go beyond it; search rather for the underlying 
realities …, which are hidden.’ Michael’s Platonism signifies the impulse to see beyond 
evidence (ibid. 52). According to my analysis here, Michael persistently insists on the 
superior nobility of humans over the animals, similar to God’s nobility. This discussion 
points strongly to Michael’s distinctive dualism. 
61 In De an. 173.1–7; 187.35–39; 210.15–211.13; 290.4–8. See Sorabji (1993: 49). This 
position allows the ascription of beliefs to animals. See Dennett (1976: 181–87); Sorabji 
(1993: 28). For the escape from the body, see Plotinus, Enn. 2.3, 9.20–23. 
62 See Arabatzis (2006: 318–22; 2009: 179–84). 
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objects of theoretical, scientific activity.63 The appeal to humans to study 
living things addresses the pre-scientific intentionality which would be the 
ontological structure that we need in order to ground natural science. This 
first intentionality leads to the second one and to the intellectual activity of 
science. In fact the distinction between the two intentionalities cannot be 
definitive and the pre-scientific intentionality is rather a proto-scientific than 
a non-scientific one. The error would be to make intentionality pass for sen-
sation; because of τὸ σωµατοειδές, i.e. the corporeal reasoning, humans are 
capable of missing science. If we return to the paradigm of the animals and 
plants saying ‘we are noble objects of science’, we may say that the image 
of the speaking animals and plants is deceptive, but the deception is re-
versed because of the propositional content of the intentional act. In 
Michael’s view, intentional acts without propositional content are not as 
epistemologically satisfying as the ones endowed with propositional con-
tent. This is the case with the view of organic parts that causes distress to 
the general viewer, where the ill feeling is produced by non-propositional 
intentionality paired with an axiological presupposition based on the 
pleasure-pain distinction. Part of what we see in Michael of Ephesus is clas-
sical Greek intellectualism stemming from the superiority of Logos. Another 
part is a Christian attitude that promotes physical realism. Michael of 
Ephesus appears to be part of a long philosophical tradition concerning the 
difficult relations between intentionality and the natural world. 
                                                
63 With regard to the sources for Michael’s theory of intentionality, besides what has al-
ready been said, Aristotle is not the prime candidate since the question of intentional acts in 
his writings is confined between physicalism and phantasia (see Caston 2001; Sorabji 
2001a; Rapp 2001; Weidemann 2001; see also Arabatzis 2006: 318–22). As for the Neo-
platonic sources, Sorabji claims that no intentional objects can be acknowledged in intel-
lectual thought according to the Neoplatonists (Sorabji 2001b). D. J. O’Meara supports the 
thesis that intentional objects exist in discursive thought according to later Neoplatonism 
(O’Meara 2001). A number of the notions O’Meara examines (πρᾶγµα, ἀρχή, ἕξις, ge-
ometry) are to be found in Michael’s In De part. an. 1.3–2.10. The mechanism of inten-
tionality is described by O’Meara in the following terms: ‘the correspondence between the 
ideal order of metaphysical discursive thought and the real order of transcendent objects 
allows us to see the suggestion that discursive concepts are images of transcendent objects 
in a new light: it is not the case that discursive thought looks at these objects as if they were 
images, but rather that in developing these concepts, discursive thought produces what are 
in a sense images of transcendent objects.’ The case is illustrated by a passage from 
Philoponus, In De an. III (Latin version) 88.37–49 (O’Meara 2001: 123). 
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